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Abstract
Interest rates on consumer lending are lower when funds are tied to purchase of a
durable good than when they are made available on an unconditional basis. Further,
dealers often choose to bear the ﬁnancial cost of their customers’ credit purchases. This
paper interprets this phenomenon in terms of monopolistic price discrimination. We
characterize consumers’ intertemporal consumption decisions when their borrowing and
lending rates are diﬀerent not only from each other, but also from the internal rate of
return of ﬁnancing terms for a speciﬁc durable good purchase. A stylized model oﬀers
a closed-form characterization of purchase decisions as a function of the amount and
timing of consumers’ resources, of the spread between the borrowing and lending rates,
and of the pricing of cash and credit purchases. We then study theoretical and empirical
relationships between the structure of ﬁnancial markets, the distribution of potential
customers’ current and future income, and incentives for durable-good dealers to price-
discriminate by subsidizing their liquidity-constrained customers’ installment-payment
terms. Our empirical analysis takes advantage of a rich set of installment-credit and
personal-loan data, which oﬀer considerable support for the assumptions and implications
of our theoretical perspective.
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Installment-payment terms for durable good purchases are often quite attractive from a ﬁnancial
point of view. Even though the “zero” annual percentage rates routinely advertised by car dealers
and department stores do not include processing fees and other transaction costs, credit is generally
cheaper when explicitly tied to the purchase of a good or service than in the case of a general
consumption loan. Relatively low interest rates are not surprising if the good purchased serves as
collateral. While lenders do repossess housing, cars, and other valuable items, repossession is not
economically appealing option in the case of appliances and consumer electronics. Low interest
rates charged on installment payment of these and other items with low second-hand value may
be rationalized if the loans that fund purchases of illiquid goods are likely to be repaid. Since
such borrowing is only sensible if the item is actually used, moral hazard may in fact be less of a
concern than in the case of non-ﬁnalized loans: lenders, for example, need not worry about borrowers
gambling away the loan. Adverse selection is also a less severe problem if purchase of, say, household
appliances is positively correlated with the consumers’ own inclination to repay: it would not be
surprising to ﬁnd that purchases of fast motorcycles, guns, and other goods which are unlikely to
feature such a correlation are not ﬁnanced on particularly favorable terms.
More interestingly, favorable credit terms are often extended by the sellers of durable goods
rather than by lending institutions (banks). When dealers ﬁnd it proﬁtable to oﬀer (e.g.) “zero
APR” ﬁnancing, the amount credited by the bank to the seller’s account is less than the cash price,
because the customer’s ﬂow of installment payments is also lower than what would be required by
the bank’s cost of funds, transaction costs, and assessment of repayment probabilities. To explain
this phenomenon, it is useful to note that durable good dealers typically have incentives to engage in
monopolistic price discrimination. The groups of consumers attracted by cash and credit purchases
are distinctly diﬀerent when, as is realistic, borrowing rates are higher than lending rates on the
ﬁnancial market. Hence, sellers can set cash and credit terms so as to oﬀer diﬀerent prices to cash-rich
and liquidity-constrained customers, in much the same way as lower prices are sometimes charged
to consumers who own particularly old trade-ins, or take the time to clip coupons. Depending on
the characteristics of the population of potential customers facing a seller, demand by consumers
who ﬁnd credit purchases attractive can be more price-sensitive than that by consumers who can
readily pay cash. This mechanism can potentially explain not only the existence of dealer-subsidized
consumer credit, but also its diﬀerent prevalence across diﬀerent regional and sectorial markets, and
the possibility that dealers charge ﬁnders’ fees to lending institutions–eﬀectively increasing the
borrowing rate for liquidity-constrained customers above the interest rate that lending institutions
1would be willing to extend for loans tied to durable purchases.
While these and other qualitative rationalizations of interest-rate diﬀerentials across diﬀerent
consumer-loan instruments appear interesting and realistic, formal analyses are scarce in the litera-
ture, as is empirical evidence. The topic was introduced and studied a long time ago by Juster and
Shay (1964). Noting, as we do below, that interest rates are diﬀerent on consumers’ assets, liabili-
ties, and durable purchases, Juster and Shay characterize qualitatively the implications of this state
of aﬀairs for consumer choices, and explore empirically survey data focusing in particular on the
sensitivity of aggregate consumption to changes in macroeconomic monetary conditions. Attanasio
(1995) also focuses on the importance of cash outlays for liquidity constrained consumers, who are
prepared to pay higher interest rates in exchange for longer loan duration. Empirical relationships
between borrowing opportunities and durable-good purchases have been studied by Brugiavini and
Weber (1994) and Alessie, Devereux, and Weber (1997), who propose and study models where bor-
rowing limits depend on the existing stock of durable goods, rather than on new purchases as would
be implied by the mechanisms outlined above. Some of the issues that motivate our work have been
a d d r e s s e di ns p e c i ﬁc instances, such as the use of credit cards as means of payments, and pricing
of installment-loan purchases which make the lender jointly liable in case of seller default on the
obligation to deliver goods. Customers who expect to pay the balance in full should always use their
credit card, to take advantage of the ﬂoat, rather than pay cash. Since transaction fees are levied
on merchants, and card issuers often require that customers pay the same price as for cash transac-
tions, a seller’s choice of whether or not to accept credit (or debit) card in lieu of cash payment is
less trivial. It depends on the quantity and quality (in willingness-to-pay terms) of additional sales
generated by credit card acceptance (Murphy and Ott, 1977; Chakravorti and To, 1999). In the
model of Iossa and Palumbo (2000), sellers also have incentives to stipulate joint-liability agreements
with lenders if this increases their sales volume, because the additional ﬁnancing costs entailed by
the lender’s joint liability are more than oﬀset, from the perspective of buyers, by the fact that the
installment loan will not need to be repaid in case of dealer default.
This paper proposes and solves a rather general intertemporal model of purchase decisions by
consumers endowed with diﬀerent, and diﬀerently timed, amounts of purchasing power. Our model’s
consumers are faced with diﬀerent interest rates on positive assets and negative assets (consumption
loans). The rate of return implicit in the comparison of cash and credit prices for the good under
consideration is larger than the interest rate on the consumer’s assets, but lower than that charged on
his negative assets. We characterize the implications for purchase decisions of the resulting complex
structure of intertemporal rates of transformation, we study how the distribution of purchasing power
over time across the population of consumers aﬀects the dealers’ price-discrimination incentives, and
2we bring empirical analysis of a credit contract database to bear on the real-life relevance of the
model’s simple theoretical insights.
1.1 Motivating evidence
We begin by documenting the extent and character of interest rate heterogeneity across installment-
payment loans. We provide both aggregate and ﬁrm-level evidence that installment credit rates are
somewhat lower than those of alternative loans which are not linked to the purchase of a good. We
focus on the case of the Italian consumer credit market, for which ﬁrm-level data are available. Our
data set includes a random sample of more than 200,000 credit applications by more than 120,000
individuals, over the period 1995—1999, to the leading supplier of consumer credit in Italy. Alessie,
Hochguertel, and Weber (2001) oﬀer a detailed description of the data set, and empirical analysis
of the time-series and cross-sectional impact of introduction of a law on usury rates in 1997. This
law stipulates that no credit lender may charge interest rates (compound overall annual rates) that
exceed 150% of benchmark rates for several types of loans, usually subdivided into size classes. The
aggregated data from the Bank of Italy shows that recorded installment credit rates are consistently
lower than those of personal loans (with the exception of small loans, which are not disaggregated
in the case of personal loans). For example, in the ﬁrst quarter of 1999 the interest rate for personal
loans larger than ten million Italian Lira (5,200 Euro) is 17% compared to 11% for the case of
installment credit.1
The ﬁrm-level evidence is summarized in Table 1. For the sample of customers that do pay for
their own borrowing costs (rather than obtaining a subsidy from the dealer, on which see below),
it is easy to calculate internal rates of return for two types of consumer credit: installment credit
contracts and personal loan contracts.2 Since the intended use of money borrowed is provided in
the application form not only for installment but also for personal loans, we can group observations
according to the type of item bought. The personal loans observations refer to purchases of only four
good categories, and for these categories it is therefore possible to measure the interest rate surcharge
entailed by customers dealing with the bank directly rather than through a dealer. Regressions of
interest rates on various observables are of more general interest, however, and will be used in
our more structural empirical work below. In preliminary regressions, not reported, we included
all available contract and customer information as explanatory variables, ﬁnding that interest rate
variability is mostly accounted for by time, region, and type of item purchased, plus a limited number
1The data is published quarterly by the Bank of Italy and the Italian Foreign Exchange Oﬃce. See Alessie et al.
(2001) for further details.
2The data also contain information on revolving credit, but interest charges cannot be inferred from the data.
3of contract characteristics (such as loan size).3
Since consumer credit is quite heterogenous across goods in a number of dimensions, we proceed
to run regressions on subsamples by type of item bought. Table 1 reports the results: while the
pattern of coeﬃcient signs is broadly similar across good categories, the data strongly reject pooling
of observations across items bought. The regressions are in the form
internal rate of return = µ + α · [personal loan]+β · X + ε
where [personal loan] is a dummy for a personal loan contract, and the vector X contains information
about the size of the contract and a host of qualitative characteristics captured by dummies. We
include contract characteristics, such as loan size, duration of the credit contract, and whether the
contract provides insurance to cover payments due in the event of “income loss” (the cost of this
insurance premium is, of course, included in the rate charged to the customer). Moreover, we control
for region and time eﬀects (the reference case is an installment payment contract issued in Lazio in
the third quarter of 1995) and various interactions (see the note to Table 1). The error term ε does
not have a structural interpretation, but for descriptive purposes it is comforting to ﬁnd that the
model yields very high R-squared values on the large cross-section of data we analyze.
In the modeling framework we propose, the personal-loan dummy should be associated with a
higher borrowing rate (b α > 0). As is apparent in Table 1, this is the case for all durable-good
types where the test is possible, and signiﬁcantly so in 3 of the 4 cases. In order to interpret the
magnitude of the coeﬃcients, note that the included interactions of the personal loan dummy with
contract characteristics and time dummies are quite signiﬁcant, indicating that (for example) ﬁxed
costs of credit provision play a diﬀerent role across personal and installment loans as well as across
diﬀerent good categories. The data, however, do indicate that the rate charged to customers on
installment plans is substantially smaller than that charged on personal loans meant to ﬁnance the
same purchase.
2 The consumer’s problem
We proceed to set up and solve a simple formal model. In general, a consumer’s decision to purchase
a durable good depends on tastes, on prices, and on the funds available for that and other purposes.
When ﬁnancial markets are imperfect, current and future funds are not perfectly substitutable:
hence, optimal choices depend not only on the total amount but also on the timing of the consumer’s
3Variables that relate to the individual loan applicant are much less relevant, and not surprisingly so since cred-
itworthiness does not aﬀect the interest rate charged by the bank. Hence, individual characteristics become known
(and may only aﬀect whether credit is granted) after the terms of ﬁnancing are decided.
4resources, which interacts in interesting and complex ways with the relationship between the cash and
credit prices of the good and with the intertemporal rates of transformation applicable to borrowing
and lending contracts.
In order to model such issues in the simplest possible way, we consider a two-period representation
of the consumer’s tastes. Let C denote nondurable consumption in the current period, when the
choice of whether to buy a speciﬁc durable good is made, and let A denote the funds available for
future purchases. Utility is assumed to be increasing and concave in both current consumption and
future resources and, of course, given levels of C and A should be associated with higher levels
of utility when the durable good is available for use in the current and future periods. Suitable
formal models can represent preferences by an intertemporally separable objective function U(C,δ)+
V (A,δ), with δ =1if the durable good is available and δ =0otherwise, such that











for all C and all A. Preferences in this form are assumed in, e.g., Spence’s (1977) study of durable-
good pricing when product quality is not directly observable. With little loss of generality, Spence
assumes that U(C,1) = U(C,0), and notes that speciﬁcations such as V (A,1) = V (A,0) + k or
V (A,1) = V (A + k,0) for some constant k may be interesting special cases for characterization
purposes.
Maximization of (1) is of course subject to budget constraints. We denote with W the consumer’s
current cash on hand; with Y the amount of purchasing power that will become available (with
certainty) in the future; with ra the rate of return on the consumer’s assets; and with rb ≥ ra the
interest rate charged on his borrowing (negative assets). Thus, when the durable is not purchased
the budget constraint reads
A = Y +
½
(W − C)(1 + ra) if C<W ,
(W − C)(1 + rb) otherwise. (2)
When the durable good is purchased, the budget-constraint relationship between current and future
resources and utility-function arguments is similar but, of course, needs to account for the durable’s
price by subtracting it from the consumer’s resources.
To simplify notation, suppose the durable good may be either paid in cash, at price P0, or
fully ﬁnanced, with no money down and a single installment payment P1 in the future period.
Payment plans with positive downpayments would have substantially similar implications as long as
the ﬁnancial structure of the payment plan (like the price of the durable) is taken as given by the
consumer. Thus, if the consumer purchases the good on a cash basis then P0 needs to be subtracted
5from W in the relevant version of budget constraint (2). If the good is purchased on credit instead,
then P1 is subtracted from Y . We assume that the internal rate of return of the durable good’s
ﬁnancing terms is neither lower than the rate of return on consumers assets nor higher than the





i.e., we rule out the possibility that credit purchase is preferable to cash purchase, or vice versa,
regardless of the consumer’s intertemporal pattern of resources. This would be not only unrealistic,
but also impossible to rationalize if consumer interest rates are viewed (as we do below) as the
endogenous result of optimal behavior on the part of a durable-good dealers faced by a heterogeneous
customer pool.
The consumer’s maximization problem is well deﬁned but not standard, in that it features discrete
choices and budget-constraint discontinuities. The impact on utility of current consumption and
future purchasing power, however, is fully standard. Given the amounts of current and future
resources available to fund the continuous variables C and A, the lending or borrowing choices that
maximize utility in that respect are easily characterized by familiar Euler and slackness conditions
over the two periods. The discrete choice of whether to purchase the durable good and whether
to use current or future funds for that purpose, conversely, cannot be analyzed in terms of interior
ﬁrst-order conditions, and needs to be based on pairwise comparisons of utility levels achievable
under each strategy.
We choose to illustrate the character of the solution in a simple special case where closed-
form solutions are available. Taking U(·) and V (·) to be logarithmic in their ﬁr s ta r g u m e n ta n d




log(C)+l o g ( A)+δk (4)
and optimal allocation of available funds across current consumption and future uses requires
C (1 + ra) ≤ A ≤ C (1 + rb): (5)
the left-hand inequality holds as an equality if the consumer has positive assets (is lending), and the
right-hand inequality sign holds with equality if the consumer borrows (has negative assets). If the
lending and borrowing rates are not the same, it can be optimal for the Euler condition to be slack.
When the pattern of interest rates and available resources is such as to imply that this is the case,
the consumer is liquidity constrained.
6As mentioned, current and future funds available for allocation to the continuous variables C
and A depend through the budget constraint on whether the durable is purchased and, if so, on
whether current or future funds are used to pay for it. Figure 1 displays this dependence graphically.
The horizontal axis of the ﬁgure measures amounts of current cash-on-hand W, and the vertical axis
measures amounts of funds Y that will be available in the future. If the durable is not purchased,
then the consumer under consideration optimally chooses to lend some of the current funds at rate ra
if Y< (1 + ra)W, and to borrow against some of the future funds at rate rb if Y> (1 + rb)W.W h e n
the intertemporal pattern of the consumer’s resources falls in the cone from the origin between these
two lines, the optimal constrained consumption pattern simply coincides with available resources
and, if the durable is not purchased, utility only accrues from C = W and A = Y .
The other lines plotted in the ﬁgure, whose slopes also coincide with the intertemporal rates of
transformation associated with positive and negative assets, identify cones originating from P1 on
the vertical axis and from P0 on the horizontal axis. If the consumer purchases the durable good on
a credit basis, then the levels of C and A coincide with the amount of current and residual future
funds if these lie within the cone originating from P1,a n dr e ﬂect optimal borrowing or lending
choices if they lie outside of it. It is similarly easy to characterize the implications for C and A of
a decision to purchase the durable on a cash basis, referring to the cone originating from P0 on the
horizontal axis of the ﬁgure.
In order to establish optimality of cash, credit or no purchase, the utility levels achieved in
those cases need to be compared with each other. The three utility levels depend univocally on
the parameters of the problem (resources and prices) through the intertemporal allocation choices
determined by slack Euler conditions like (5). Hence, such comparisons are conceptually easy and,
as mentioned, they could be performed numerically for much more general preference speciﬁcations
than that proposed in (4). One might for example allow for discounting of future utility, or for
non-homothetic utility. Such generalizations would imply more complex relationships than those
represented in Figure 1, where the borrowing, lending, and liquidity-constrained ranges would in
general be delimited by non-linear upward-sloping lines. The qualitative character of the solution,
however, does not depend on such details and, because of the discrete nature of the optimization
problem, formal quantitative representations are already quite complex and intriguing for the simple
objective function.
2.1 Character of the solution
We proceed to characterize the solution of the problem (4) with respect to durable purchase choices,
in terms of indiﬀerence conditions between purchase and no-purchase choices. As is intuitive, and
7apparent in ﬁgures we discuss below, the current and future funds endowments that make the
consumer indiﬀerent to purchasing or not purchasing the durable identify a (weakly) downward-
sloping locus in a ﬁgure like Figure 1: since the marginal utility of C and A is decreasing, the
consumer needs to be rich enough (in terms of current and/or future funds) before the choice of
diverting some of his or her purchasing power from C and A to the durable (which aﬀords a given
utility level k) becomes attractive. The endowment structures that make consumers indiﬀerent to
purchasing the good can never lie on an upward-sloping locus in the (W, Y ) space.4 Also intuitively,
among consumers who do purchase the durable indiﬀerence between cash or credit purchase (use of
current or future funds) is depicted by an upward-sloping locus in a ﬁgure like Figure 1: consumers
need to be relatively well endowed with future funds for a credit purchase to be preferable. The
shape of such loci depends in interesting ways on the relationship between the borrowing and lending
rates on the one hand, and on the cash and credit price of the good on the other.
To organize the derivation of such indiﬀerence loci and to oﬀer some intuition for their shape,
it will be helpful to refer to Figure 2. This ﬁgure partitions the (W, Y ) p l a n ea c c o r d i n gt ow h e t h e r
its points lie inside or outside the three cones plotted in Figure 1. Within each of the ten resulting
regions, labeled with Roman numerals, the possible lending, borrowing, and purchase choices are
restricted in interesting ways.
2.2 Computing the purchase-indiﬀerence locus
For example, if the consumer’s endowment falls in region X, optimal assets are positive regardless
of whether the durable good is purchased on a cash basis, or on credit, or not at all. It is then
straightforward (if a little cumbersome) to characterize the optimal purchase decision. If the durable
good is not purchased, then current consumption is
argmax
C










while a cash purchase reduces current consumption to
argmax
C










4Suppose instead the purchase-indiﬀerence locus were positively sloped. Consider a point (W∗,Y∗)o nt h a tl o c u s
and a point (W∗ + x,Y ∗) to its right, where x>0. The consumer would purchase the durable at (W∗,Y∗), but not
at (W∗ + x,Y ∗) despite the fact that overall resources have increased. This cannot be optimal.
8and aﬀords additional utility k. The choice is a matter of indiﬀerence for the consumer when
log(CD,a)+l o g( Y +( W − CD,a − P0)(1 + ra)) + k (6)
= log(CN,a)+l o g( Y +( W − CN,a)(1 + ra)),
a quadratic equation in P0 and W +Y/(1 + ra), the present value of funds discounted at the lending
rate. The left-hand side of (6) is larger than the right-hand side (to imply that cash purchase is












namely if the consumer’s endowment of current and future resources lies to the north-east of a
downward sloping line in region X. It remains to be checked whether credit purchase might in turn
be preferable to cash or no purchase. Quite intuitively, however, credit purchase cannot be strictly
optimal for the consumer at any point in region X, where assets are positive regardless of whether
and how the durable is purchased. In fact, when assets are positive, use of future rather than current
funds can never increase the amount of future purchasing power A for any choice of C, and hence
utility, since
Y +( W − C)(1 + ra) − P1 ≤ Y +( W − C − P0)(1 + ra)
as long as P1 ≥ (1 + ra)P0 as assumed in (3).
Symmetric reasoning is applicable in region I, where assets are negative regardless of whether
and how the durable is purchased. In that region, credit purchase is always at least weakly preferable














again a downward-sloping line in the plane depicted by the ﬁgures. The two indiﬀerence lines
would coincide if the borrowing and lending rates were equal to each other and, by (3), to the
internal rate of return of the durable’s installment-credit plan. In such a perfect-capital-markets
case, the solution would be easy and uninteresting: all the cones would collapse to lines in the ﬁgure,
consumers would always be indiﬀerent between cash and credit purchase, and only the present value







P0, but such low wealth levels would imply negative current

































9of intertemporal resources would aﬀect their choice of whether to purchase or not. When ra <r b,
conversely, the indiﬀerence locus is a more steeply declining line in region I than in region X,a n d
becomes interestingly nonlinear when the consumer’s endowment lies outside of those regions.
Characterization of the purchase decision is also quite straightforward when the (W, Y ) endow-
ment of purchasing power lies in Region IV, i.e., within all three of the cones plotted in Figure 1.
When the consumer has zero assets regardless of whether and how the good is purchased, a cash
purchase is preferable to no purchase if






and credit purchase is preferable to no purchase if






The parameters may be such that these conditions are automatically satisﬁed for all endowment
patterns in region IV. The horizontal and vertical coordinates of all points in that region, in fact,
are larger than those of the intersection point of the ﬂatter boundary of the cone originating from
P1 on the vertical axis with the steeper boundary of the cone originating from P0 on the horizontal
axis, i.e., the solution of P1 +( 1+ra)W =( W − P0)(1+rb),
W =
P1 + P0 (1 + rb)
rb − ra
, (11)
on the horizontal axis and




If the right-hand sides of (9) and (10) are larger than those of (11) and (12), then purchase of the
durable is always optimal in region IV. Otherwise, the purchase-indiﬀerence locus goes through that
region, where it consists of a vertical and horizontal segment.
To complete the characterization of optimal choices in region IV, note that for a consumer who
always has zero assets credit purchase is preferable to cash purchase if
log(W − P0)+l o g( Y )+k<log(W)+l o g( Y − P1)+k,
10i.e., if Y/W > P1/P0. Thus, any portion of the upward-sloping cash/credit purchase indiﬀerence
locus that lies in region IV is a straight line segment, with slope given by the installment plan’s
internal interest factor. We have already shown that all points in region I (X) lie above (below)
that locus; we will discuss its shape in other regions of the (W, Y ) plane in Section 2.3 below.
Indiﬀerence conditions in regions II, III, and V-IX, where purchasing the durable good is always
associated with a discrete change in the consumer’s asset position, can be derived by much the same
reasoning as that applied to the regions–considered above–where assets are positive, negative,
or zero regardless of purchase decisions. In all cases, indiﬀerence to purchase is characterized by
comparisons of expressions in the form of (6), when the consumer smooths consumption by either
borrowing or lending, or like (8), when the consumer is liquidity constrained.
Our functional form assumptions imply that all such indiﬀerence conditions deﬁne quadratic
equations in the (W, Y ) plane. Any modiﬁcation would substantially complicate analytic solution.
For example, applying a discount factor β 6=1to utility accruing from future purchasing power A
would require solution of equations of order 1+β, rather than of quadratic equations. This and other
extensions would not alter the qualitative character of the consumer’s choices, and could in principle
be studied by numerical methods. Even in our simple case, however, derivation and description
of the solution are considerably complicated by the need to consider all the possible interactions
between the discrete decision to purchase the durable good and the (also discrete) changes in the
budget set implied by the possibility of switching from positive to negative asset positions, or vice
versa, when a credit or cash purchase alters the intertemporal pattern of residual funds.
In our problem, in fact, the durable purchase has discrete implications not only for the utility
function but also for the budget constraint, since the timing of installment payments is ﬁxed rather
than a matter of choice (as would be the case if, instead, the consumer could choose the down-
payment as a continuous variable, and eﬀectively borrow any portion of the purchase price from
the seller of the durable good). This feature captures important elements of reality, since not only
the rate of interest but also the structure of installments is severely limited in most durable-good
purchases, but has complex implications for optimal behavior. For example, the possibility that
consumers who would have positive assets when the durable is not purchased may buy the durable
on credit and carry a larger amount of positive assets into the next period needs to be considered.
It may indeed be optimal, if not very intuitive, for consumers to do so: this is the case when the
intertemporal endowment structure is such that the (discrete) ﬁrst-period consumption compression
implied by a cash purchase would yield lower utility than a smaller consumption decline in the ﬁrst
period, smoothed intertemporally by a larger positive asset position, and payment of the good on
a credit basis. We discuss solution methods in the Appendix, where we characterize in closed form
11the subset of the (W, Y ) space where cash purchase is preferable to no purchase, and that where
credit purchase is preferable to no purchase. The intersection of these sets includes all intertemporal
endowment patterns that make purchase optimal.
2.3 The cash-credit indiﬀerence locus
To complete characterization of the solution, the set of (W, Y ) points for which purchase is preferable
to no-purchase can be further partitioned according to whether cash or credit payment is optimal.
The boundary of these subsets is an (upward-sloping) locus of points such that the choice of cash
or credit terms is a matter of indiﬀerence. We have already characterized this locus in region IV,
where the consumer has no assets in all cases and, quite intuitively, prefers credit to cash purchase
when Y/W > P1/P0, i.e. when the ﬁnancing terms of the durable purchase oﬀer an attractive
intertemporal rate of transformation for the assumed logarithmic speciﬁcation of preferences. As
mentioned above, in other regions (where the purchase is associated with a change in the consumer’s
asset position) complex considerations are relevant to the choice of whether to purchase on a cash or
credit basis. We report in the Appendix the exact solution for the cash/credit indiﬀerence locus in
all regions, which is continuous with slope lower than 1+rb and larger than 1+ra. Intuitively, in all
regions where the purchase implies a qualitative change in the consumer’s asset position (which can
be positive, negative, or zero) the slope of the cash-credit indiﬀerence locus is a weighted average of
the applicable intertemporal marginal rates of substitution, which all lie between 1+ra and 1+rb.
3 Characterization of consumer choices
We proceed to illustrate graphically the properties of the solution. In Figure 3, purchase-indiﬀerence
loci are plotted for increasingly large values of k, the amount of utility aﬀorded by purchase of the
durable good. The sequence of k values considered in the Figure increases more than exponentially.
When k is small, the consumer needs to be quite rich in order to ﬁnd purchase attractive, because
of decreasing marginal utility from C and A. Hence, in the ﬁgure the purchase indiﬀerence frontier
shifts inwards as increasingly large values of k are considered. In the ﬁgure, the boundaries of the
asset-position regions deﬁned in Figure 2 are also plotted. Recall that these depend only on the
borrowing and lending rates, and on the cash and credit prices, but are not aﬀected by k.T h e
cash-credit indiﬀerence locus is also independent of k. For the chosen parameter values it would lie
only in region IV,i fk were suﬃciently small to make purchase of the durable less than optimal
for some consumers who have no assets independent of their durable purchase decision. When k is
larger, the cash-credit indiﬀerence lies in regions where purchase implies a qualitative change in the
12asset position.
If k is small, the purchase-indiﬀerence locus goes through region IV, where it has a horizontal
and a vertical segment. In general, the nonlinearity of the purchase-indiﬀerence locus becomes more
pronounced as the consumer’s imperfect access to borrowing and lending opportunities becomes
more relevant to the purchase decision. Intuitively, the indiﬀerence locus tends to become (and is,
in region IV) horizontal when the consumer is liquidity constrained, because when future resources
are too low to make a credit purchase appealing (and ﬁnancial markets are not accessed) then an
increase of current resources does not make such a purchase any more desirable. For a given degree
of ﬁnancial market imperfection, as represented by the diﬀerence between rb and ra in the model,
the relevance of ﬁnancial market access for durable purchase decisions depends on k.
Symmetrically, for a given k the nonlinearity of the purchase indiﬀerence frontier depends on the
relationship between rb and ra. This is illustrated in Figure 4, where we plot purchase-indiﬀerence
loci for increasingly large values of rb,k e e p i n gk, ra,a n dP0 constant, and varying P1 so that the
internal rate of return of the installment-payment plan is always equal to the average of the borrowing
and lending rates in the ﬁnancial market (P1/P0 =1+( ra +rb)/2). The straight downward sloping
line in the ﬁgure represents the case of perfect ﬁnancial markets, i.e., ra = rb which is equal to the
internal rate of return of the installment plan. We do not plot the cones deﬁning liquidity-constrained
regions in the ﬁgure. It is not diﬃcult to see, however, that regions where assets are zero (contingent
on one or more of the possible choices open to the consumer) become larger as ﬁnancial market access
becomes more diﬃcult. In the ﬁgure, ﬁnancing terms for durable-good purchase become relatively
more favorable compared to unconditional loan rates, and the nonlinear character of the consumer’s
choices becomes more and more pronounced.
Additional qualitative features of the solution are illustrated in Figure 5, where for a given k we
keep P0, ra and rb constant but vary P1. Not surprisingly, as P1 increases the purchase-indiﬀerence
locus shifts outward, i.e., the consumer needs to be richer in order to ﬁnd it optimal to purchase
the durable good. Of course, this is more pronounced for conﬁgurations of the endowment that are
relatively tilted towards the future: any change of the delayed-payment terms for the good (as long
as the internal rate is larger than ra) is irrelevant for consumers who have positive assets and buy
the durable with cash, while consumers who are liquidity constrained or borrow can be induced to
buy the good by a better ﬁnancing deal.
134 Implications for dealer pricing of ﬁnancial terms
The simple qualitative insights outlined in the introduction, and the more precise quantitative per-
spective oﬀered by our modeling approach, can be brought to bear on various aspects of reality and
of the data available to us.
Our formal, if simpliﬁed, characterization of consumer choices makes it possible to explore in-
centives by dealers to subsidize (or mark-up) their consumers’ ﬁnancing rates. We consider a dealer
w h oh a sas p e c i ﬁc durable good available for sale, normalize marginal cost to zero with no loss of




D1(P0,P 1).( 1 3 )
where D0(P0,P 1) is the quantity purchased on a cash basis at price P0,a n dD1(P0,P 1) is the quantity
purchased on a credit basis. For each customer who purchases the good on credit, the dealer receives
from the bank the customer’s installment payment P1,d i s c o u n t e da tr a t erf. In the model, as in
reality, the bank handles the ﬁnancial side of the durable purchase transaction, and the dealer faces
no default risk.
Suppose the dealer is faced by a population of potential customers that behave like the one char-
acterized in the previous section, and let their current and future ﬁnancial resources be distributed
according to the bivariate density function f(W, Y ).L e t Y = χ(W;P0,P 1,k,r a,r b) denote the
upward-sloping cash-credit indiﬀerence locus of Figure 3, and let Y = π(W;P0,P 1,k,r a,r b) denote
the downward-sloping line of indiﬀerence between purchasing and not purchasing the good in that
and the other ﬁgures of the previous section. As shown above, the future-resource level Y identiﬁed
by each of these loci depends on current resources W, as well as on the cash and credit prices and on
the speciﬁcation of tastes (parameterized by k in the model) and of the ﬁnancial market environment
(parameterized by ra and rb).
Let ω denote the current-resource coordinate of the two schedules’ intersection point, implicitly
deﬁned by
χ(ω;P0,P 1,k,r a,r b)=π(ω;P0,P 1,k,r a,r b).
Then, the quantity sold on a cash basis can be expressed as an integral over the appropriate region

























The model features three distinct interest rates, ra <r f <r b. Since “the bank” (or ﬁnancial
sector) is the counterpart of the consumers’ deposit and borrowing relationships, the wedges rf−ra >
0 and rb−ra > 0 reﬂect intermediation costs and non-repayment risk, which may be left unmodeled
for this paper’s purposes. The wedge rb − rf > 0 between the interest rates charged by the bank
on unrestrained consumer borrowing and on durable good installment payments reﬂects diﬀerential
transaction costs and repayment behavior, through the selection eﬀects outlined in the Introduction.
If the cash and credit prices are related according to P1 =( 1+rf)P0, then the dealer’s revenues
are not aﬀected by the proportion of cash and credit sales. Besides choosing the overall level of the
item’s price, however, the dealer can also choose to set the installment price as a diﬀerent ratio of the
cash price. In fact, it will be generally optimal for the dealer to do so, and exploit the opportunity





in fact, diﬀerent sets of consumers are attracted by cash and credit purchases. Hence, a dealer
faced with a population of potential customers that is heterogeneous across the two dimensions of
the ﬁgures above (current and future purchasing power) should in general ﬁnd it optimal to charge
diﬀerent prices to the subsets of that population that are attracted by cash and credit purchase
terms.















































15where ε0,P0 denotes the elasticity of the cash quantity with respect to the cash price, and the
other elasticities are deﬁned similarly. Demand elasticities depend on the shape of the bivariate
distribution of current and future purchasing power in the population, and on the wedge between
borrowing and lending rates. In general, they are diﬀerent across the two groups, and so are the
optimal present-value prices charged by the dealer.
In order to characterize such relationships more precisely and discuss how they may bear on
available empirical information, the relevant mechanisms can be illustrated with numerical com-
putations based on a simple parameterized model. We suppose that the population’s distribution
of current and future resources is well approximated by a bivariate normal distribution over the
relevant region (this distribution attaches positive probability to negative levels of W and Y ,w h i c h
however are irrelevant because they can never be associated with purchase decisions). We can then
compute numerical counterparts to the demand expressions (14) and (15) for every pricing choice by
the dealer, and determine the optimal one by numerically integrating the dealer’s objective function
(13) and performing a grid search over the relevant region of P0 and P1 (1+ra ≤ P1
P0 ≤ 1+rb) for
each set of parameter values. The algorithm also computes numerical counterparts of the ﬁrst or-
der conditions (16) and (17), and checks that they are satisﬁed at the maximum identiﬁed by the
grid-search procedure.
Numerical solution of the dealer’s optimization problem oﬀers useful insights into the relationship
between the market’s structure and incentives to engage in price discrimination across groups of
customers who are more or less inclined to use current rather than future resources. Of course, if it
w e r et h ec a s et h a tra = rb = rf =¯ r then the terms of durable-good ﬁnancing deals would be unable
to discriminate among customers. In the face of this perfect-ﬁnancial-markets conﬁguration, if the
dealer oﬀered favorable ﬁnancing terms (P1/P0 < 1+¯ r)t h e nall customers would take advantage
of them, and the dealer’s interest rate subsidy would be equivalent to a lower price. Even less
interestingly, if the dealer tried to charge his credit customers more than the market interest rate
(P1/P0 > 1+¯ r) then no consumer would accept such unfavorable terms, and those who prefer to
devote future resources to the durable purchase would simply borrow on the market and pay cash.
Quite intuitively, the scope for dealer price discrimination increases with the spread between the
lending and borrowing rates on the ﬁnancial market. Figure 6 reports the results of a sequence of
numerical experiments where the spread rb − ra between consumers’ borrowing and lending rates
(on the horizontal axis) increases, keeping such rates symmetrically above and below a given bank
durable ﬁnancing rate rf. On the vertical axis, the Figure reports the ratio of the dealer’s revenue-
maximizing credit and cash prices. Since this is lower than 1+ rf, the dealer pays part of the
16interest charged by the bank.6 In Figure 6, larger bid-ask spreads in the ﬁnancial market are
associated with more substantial subsidization of consumer credit rates by dealers, who are better
able to discriminate among their customers (adjusting both P0 and P1) when a larger proportion of
them is liquidity constrained.
This result is intuitive, but not obvious, and robust to other parameter conﬁgurations. We
have also experimented with other perturbations of the ﬁnancial market’s structural feature. An
intuitive insight is illustrated in Figure 7: as rf increases while rb and ra remain constant, the dealer
becomes increasingly less inclined to subsidize customers’ interest charges. It is not diﬃcult to see
why, since any given ﬁnancing rate entails larger subsidies on the part of the dealer. We see in the
Figure that the relationship is not linear, and the pass-through from bank rates into dealer ﬁnancing
terms is less than one for one. In reality, the degree of ﬁnancial market imperfection works through
both of the channels illustrated in Figures 6 and 7, and the resulting relationship between various
liquidity-constraint indicators and the incidence of dealer-subsidized credit may be quite complex. A
prediction of the model, however, is that dealer-subsidized credit should be more prevalent in market
segments where large interest rate spreads imply strong segmentation of the potential customer
population. Of course, the character of the distribution of current and future resources across the
customer population also aﬀects the scope for price discrimination (in the limit case of no variation
across the population in the relevant respects, the dealer could not possibly discriminate among
them). Numerical experimentation conﬁrms that, indeed, the spread and correlation parameters of
the distribution play an important, if quite complex role in determining the diﬀerence between the
dealer’s ﬁnancing terms and the bank’s ﬁnancing rate for given values of the latter, of rb, and of ra.
4.1 Empirical evidence
In the Italian markets from which our data set is drawn, as in the model, dealers can choose to absorb
interest payments and oﬀer attractive ﬁnancial terms to those among their customers who are inclined
to purchase on credit. The installment-purchase data available to us, and already analyzed above,
contain information on the characteristics of both the individual and of the good purchased (but
no information as to the identity of the dealer), as well as an indication of whether the dealer pays
interest, or not. In the latter case, ﬁnancial charges can be computed as the internal rate of return
of the consumers’ repayment obligations. When dealers pay all interest, the banks’ interest charges
are not observable. In practice, and presumably as a reﬂection of institutional details, dealers almost
always do oﬀer “zero” interest rates when they subsidize their customers’ credit purchases. Very
6If it were higher, the dealer actually would ﬁnd it optimal to charge a higher interest rate on installment plans than
the bank’s required rate of return. In reality, dealers are indeed sometimes in a position to charge fees, because banks
rely on them to contact customers and ensure that the credit is indeed disbursed towards a durable-good purchase.
17few (less than 1.5%) of the contracts in the sample see dealers paying only a portion of the bank’s
interest charges, and most (74%) of such contracts relate to motorcycle purchases. We decided to
drop all partially subsidized installment plans from the sample, and analyze the likelihood of complete
subsidization. To model this discrete rather than continuous variation in interest subsidies, we run
semi-structural probit models, aiming to predict the probability that the dealer subsidizes credit:
the left-hand side variable of the probit regressions reported below takes value one when the dealer
pays the installment plan’s ﬁnancial charges, zero when the consumer pays them.
In our theoretical model, incentives for dealers to subsidize installment payment plans depend in
complex ways on the distribution of potential customers’ current and future purchasing power, and
on the structure of their lending and borrowing opportunities. In preliminary regressions we found
that the likelihood of a given contract receiving a dealer subsidy is empirically related to all contract
and most customer characteristics. The empirical association of dealer-subsidized installment plans
with the latter (such as age, marital status, and especially income) cannot be given a structural
interpretation, however. While ﬁnancial institutions do reserve the right to refuse credit to individual
consumers on the basis of the information reported on the application form, dealers are unable to
price-discriminate across individuals when, as is the case in the reality from which our data are
drawn, the terms of installment payment plans for small durable purchases are posted along with
the cash price on the dealer’s premises. Hence, the empirical relevance of individual characteristics
presumably reﬂects selection of the overall distribution of such characteristics into the subset of
installment purchases, within each good category, that dealers choose to subsidize.
In Tables 2 and 3 we report the results of two types of semi-structural probit regressions, focus-
ing on variation of some relevant variables at the regional level as an exogenous shifter. We report
results on subsamples by item purchased. Pooled regressions yielded much worse results, indicating
that focusing on homogeneous groups of observations does improve the ﬁt of theory and data. Even
within groups, however, the data are very imperfectly represented by the stylized model proposed
and solved above. For example, more or less luxurious items within a given category are certainly
characterized by diﬀerent willingness-to-pay parameters (represented by k in the model–see Fig-
ure 3). In general, this aﬀects a dealer’s incentive to price discriminate for given values of other
parameters, and can make it diﬃcult or impossible to detect their eﬀect. We address this problem
controlling for observable characteristics of each installment plan, such as the amount of the loan.
Even though the coeﬃcients of such variables have no structural interpretation, controlling for them
can highlight the relationship between ﬁnancial market imperfections and price discrimination in-
centives illustrated in Figure 6 and 7. Accordingly, the probit speciﬁcation includes demographics,
contract characteristics and time dummies. The regressions reported in Table 2 make no attempt
18to control for the income distribution, but use all the Findomestic data, and can exploit time vari-
ation in interest rates across the years 1996-1998. Conversely, the regression reported in Table 3
controls for income growth at the regional level over the 1995-98 period, but is restricted to the 1996
cross-section.
The variables of structural interest in Table 2 are meant to capture the eﬀect shown in Figures 6
and 7. As illustrated in Figure 6, a larger spread between borrowing and lending rates is predicted
by the model to lead to more subsidization by dealers. Spreads between bank lending and deposit
rates are computed on the basis of time-series data disaggregated across regions (see the Table for
source and deﬁnitions). While available rates are not directly comparable to the consumer credit
interest rates observed in our data set, spreads between them should be qualitatively related to
relevant variation in ﬁnancial-market development across regions and over time. We also know
(see Figure 7) that higher ﬁnancial charges reduce the dealer’s incentive to subsidize installment
purchases. The rate charged on installment purchases, rf, is only observable in our data set for
observations where the customer pays. For observations where dealers pay interest, we impute the
(unobservable) ﬁnancial charge on the basis of regressions of the type reported in Table 1. In doing
so, of course, we neglect the possibility that contracts are selected into the subsidized subsample on
the basis of variation in the underlying rate charged by the ﬁnancial institution (rf in the model).
Such selection, however, has in principle ambiguous eﬀects on the measurement of the eﬀects of
interest.7
Our modeling perspective predicts that, ceteris paribus, larger interest rate spreads on the ﬁnan-
cial market should increase dealers’ propensity to absorb their customers’ installment-credit ﬁnancial
charges, while higher ﬁnancial charges should have the opposite eﬀect. This is borne out by the data
for white goods, telephony, household appliances, and brown goods (consumer electronics). The
interest rate diﬀerential is signiﬁcant only for the latter two categories, but since these are the most
numerous and arguably most homogenous groups in the data set, the result do oﬀer empirical sup-
port for the theory. Besides variables meant to capture the structural eﬀects of Figures 6 and 7,
many others have highly signiﬁcant marginal eﬀects, and may satisfactorily control for heterogeneity
of item characteristics within each of the broad categories (larger loans are more likely to be subsi-
dized by the dealer) and of credit-transaction details (loan duration, insurance against income loss,
whether installment payments are charged directly to a bank account, and the existence of a data
link between the dealer and the credit provider). Some individual characteristics are also signiﬁ-
7We also experimented with inserting the level of regionally disaggregated interest rates, which are sharply declining
over time during the sample period. The results were not easily interpretable, and not suprisingly so in light of the
fact that the pattern of market penetration by our data source in the various regions and over time is arguably an
important source of variation in the relevant interest rates.
19cant, presumably reﬂecting their prevalence in customer populations whose borrowing is optimally
subsidized by price-discriminating dealers: older customers, singles, tenants, and mortgage holders
are less likely to receive dealer interest subsidies. Time dummies are also included (and signiﬁcant)
as controls for other, non-structural sources of heterogeneity. We do not report them in the table,
but it may be worth mentioning that no overall trends in the incidence of dealer-subsidized credit
are apparent: for example, while installment-credit purchases of “brown” goods are increasingly
subsidized over time, the opposite is the case for “telephony” items.
It is also interesting to seek empirical implementation of the model’s predictions as to the role of
future and current income distribution in determining price-discrimination incentives. The available
sample of installment contracts only includes individuals who do decide to purchase a durable item,
and to do so on an installment-credit basis. Since the distribution of all actual and potential
customers is relevant in the model, we need to use a representative sample in order to capture
the relevant eﬀects. A suitable measure of income growth at the regional level (see the notes to
Table 3 for details) can be retrieved from the panel component of the Survey of Household Income
and Wealth.8 Merging it into the ﬁrst complete yearly cross-section of contracts in our data set,
and estimating the probit model reported in Table 3, we ﬁnd that current and prospective income
growth variation across regions (computed from 1995-98 panel data) does play a signiﬁcant role in
determining the likelihood of dealer-subsidized credit in 1996. The sign of this variable’s marginal
eﬀect cannot be readily interpreted, because the characteristics of the income-distribution time
pattern facing dealers aﬀects their price-discrimination incentives in complex and nonlinear ways.
Still, the empirical relevance of our modeling perspective is supported by its signiﬁcance, and by the
fact that the structurally interesting variables introduced in Table 2 survive its inclusion.9 In Table
3, especially for the more numerous and homogenous subsamples, the interest rate on installment
payments still tends to have a negative and signiﬁcant eﬀect on dealers’ propensity to absorb ﬁnancial
charges, while the interest rate spread proxy is less signiﬁcant than in Table 2’s repeated cross-section
data set.
5 Concluding comments
We have motivated, proposed, and solved a model of interrelated purchase and borrowing decisions
when, on the one hand, wedges between borrowing and lending rates in the ﬁnancial market make
8The SHIW is a survey of the Italian population ﬁelded every 2-3 years: see Brandolini and Cannari (1994) for a
description of the early waves, D’Alessio and Faiella (2000) for an introduction to the recently released 1998 wave.
9We experimented with inclusion of other moments of the regions’ current and future income distribution, as
sampled in the SHIW panel component. Since such statistics vary only across regions, however, including them tends
to make it impossible to obtain sensible results as regards the more structurally interesting ﬁnancial rate variables,
w h i c ha l s oo n l yv a r yb yr e g i o n .
20consumers’ willingness to pay depend on the relative as well as the absolute size of current and future
funds; and, on the other hand, installment-payment plans towards purchase of a speciﬁci t e mi s
available at relatively favorable rates. Further, we have rationalized in terms of price-discrimination
incentives the behavior of dealers who choose to bear the ﬁnancial cost of their customers’ credit
purchases. Since wedges between borrowing and lending rates segment the population of potential
customers into groups who are more or less inclined to borrow, any relationship between such
inclinations and the overall willingness to pay induces dealers endowed with monopoly power to
charge diﬀerent present-value prices to the two groups.
While the model proposed is very simple, its closed-form solution and numerical experiments oﬀer
intriguing insights into subtle aspects of real-life market interactions. Interest in the phenomena we
identify and model may go beyond the speciﬁc application to purchase-conditional borrowing, in
that they oﬀer formal analysis of (and empirical support for) price-discriminating behavior. Under
shelter of monopoly power, sellers do often sell identical items at diﬀerent prices to self-selected
pools of customers. Such behavior, however, is typically quite diﬃcult to characterise precisely and
pin down empirically.
Empirical analysis of a rich set of installment-credit and personal-loan data oﬀers considerable
support for the assumptions and implications of the proposed theoretical perspective. In particular,
we have oﬀered some evidence that heterogeneity across geographic, market-segment, and time
dimensions of the structure of borrowing, lending, and installment-plan interest rates has non-trivial
implications for the incidence of dealer-subsidized credit in our data.
Such heterogeneity is taken as exogenous in our work, but may be endogenous to higher-level
economic interactions. In the reality we model and study empirically, imperfections of the market
for unconditional credit increase the scope for consumer-credit dealer subsidies. Competition among
dealers, and among banks and specialized credit institutions, can in principle play a very important
role in determining the scope of ﬁnancial market imperfections and their incidence on diﬀerent con-
sumer groups. Aggregate ﬁnancial market development indicators might hide important interactions
between more detailed imperfections in unconditional and conditional credit markets, and the mod-
eling perspective we propose may also have interesting implications for the pattern of durable and
nondurable expenditure by individual consumers. For example, consumers with fast-increasing in-
come patterns may not ﬁnd it optimal to borrow in order to ﬁnance current nondurable consumption
(especially when such borrowing is expensive and/or severely constrained). They should, however, be
inclined to tilt their consumption bundles towards the kinds of durable goods that feature favorable
ﬁnancing arrangements. The resulting interaction between durable stocks and expenditure ﬂows on
the one hand, and ﬁnancial market imperfections on the other, appears interestingly diﬀerent from
21that featured in Alessie, Devereux, Weber (1997) and other related contributions. It might be possi-
ble in further work to study such phenomena combining detailed information on the characteristics
of customer who do apply for credit (and may or may not be oﬀered a subsidy by dealers) with the
information on ﬁnancial market access and durable expenditure patterns available in representative
data sets, such as the Bank of Italy survey studied here and by Alessie, Hochguertel, Weber (2001)
a n dB e r t o l a ,G u i s o ,P i s t a f e r r i( 2 0 0 1 ) .
22Appendices
A Exact solution: purchase indiﬀerence
In this Appendix we list algebraic formulae deﬁning the combinations of current and future resources that
make a consumer indiﬀerent between purchasing or not purchasing the durable good. We omit details of
the derivation, which are in general quite similar to those discussed in the text for regions I, IV, X and
always lead to quadratic equations. The sign of the root in the solution is always uniquely determined
by considering restrictions on the possible values of W and Y in each of the regions. Again taking such
restrictions into account, the slope of the indiﬀerence locus can be shown to be weakly negative in all regions
considered here. The indiﬀerence locus is continuous at the boundaries of the regions: values at all boundary
points are reported in Tables at the end of this Appendix section. It is also continuously diﬀerentiable,
unless indiﬀerence between cash and credit purchase also happens to obtain when a boundary is crossed by
the purchase-indiﬀerence locus.
A.1 Region II
As is clear from inspection of Figure 2, in this region the consumer has no assets (is liquidity-constrained)
if the durable good is purchased on credit, and has negative assets (borrows) otherwise.














The endowments that make the consumer indiﬀerent between a credit purchase and no purchase lie on
the locus:
Y = W(1 + rb)(2ek − 1) − 2
q
W2(1 + rb)2(e2k − ek) − ek(1 + rb)WP1.
A.2 Region III
The asset position of the consumer depending on whether the durable is purchased and, if so, on a cash or
credit basis can again be inferred easily from Figure 2 in this and all other regions. The endowments that
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The endowments in this region that make the consumer indiﬀerent to purchasing the good with cash are
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ek(1 + rb) − (1 + ra)
.
A.4 Region VI
The endowments in this region that make the consumer indiﬀerent to purchasing the good with cash are
described by the same relationship as in Region III.
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The endowments in this region that make the consumer indiﬀerent to purchasing the good with cash are
described by the same relationship as in Region IV. The endowments in this region that make the consumer
indiﬀerent to purchasing the good with credit are described by the same relationship as in Region VI.
A.6 Region VIII
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A.7 Region IX




2ek(W − P0) − W − 2
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.
The endowments in this region that make the consumer indiﬀerent to purchasing the good with credit
are described by the same relationship as in Region VIII.
24A.8 Region X














The endowments in this region that make the consumer indiﬀerent to purchasing the good with credit
are described by the same relationship as in Region VIII.
A.9 Continuity
The following tables report the values of the indiﬀerence locus at all points where it crosses the boundaries of
two regions. In all cases, the value is the same whether it is computed with the above analytic expressions for
either one of the regions. The ﬁrst table reports the intersection points for the cash purchase-no purchase
indiﬀerence locus. The second table reports the intersection points for the credit purchase-no purchase
indiﬀerence locus.
25Table: Continuity Purchase Indiﬀerence I
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26Table: Continuity Purchase Indiﬀerence II
Intersection Credit purchase - no purchase indiﬀerence:
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27B Exact solution: cash-credit indiﬀerence
In this Appendix we list algebraic formulae deﬁning the combinations of current and future resources that
make a consumer indiﬀerent between purchasing the durable good with cash or with installment credit.
Recall from the discussion in the text that cash purchase is never optimal in region I whereas credit purchase
cannot be optimal in region X. We omit details of the derivation, which are in general quite similar to those
discussed in the text for region IV. The sign of the root in the solution is always uniquely determined by
considering that the cash-credit indiﬀerence locus has to be upward sloping.
This can be shown by an argument similar to the one used to prove the weakly negative slope of the
purchase indiﬀerence locus. Suppose the cash-credit indiﬀerence locus were negatively sloped. Then it would
separate the W −Y space in two regions one of which would be further away from the origin than the other.
i) Imagine a pair (W0,Y 0) for which it is optimal to purchase the durable with cash. Then the pair
must lie above the negatively sloped frontier. Otherwise, a suﬃciently large increase of present resources
W induces a change from cash to credit purchase. This, however can never be optimal. Hence, the region
where cash purchase is optimal must be the region further away from the region.
ii) Imagine a pair (W0,Y 0) for which it is optimal to purchase the durable on credit. Then the pair must
lie above the negatively sloped frontier. Otherwise, it would be possible that an increase of future resources
Y induces a change of credit to cash purchase. This, however, can never be optimal.
Now, i) implies that in the region above the cash-credit indiﬀerence locus cash purchase is optimal, and
ii) implies that in this region credit purchase is optimal. By contradiction, the cash-credit indiﬀerence locus
cannot be downward sloping.
The indiﬀerence locus is continuous and continuously diﬀerentiable at the boundaries of the regions. Its
values at all boundary points are reported in a Table at the end of this Appendix.
B.1 Region II, III
In Region III the frontier is characterized by indiﬀerence between buying the durable cash and borrowing,
versus buying the durable credit and depleting assets, i.e.,
1
4(1 + rb)
(Y +( W − P0)(1 + rb))2ek = W(Y − P1)ek
which yields
Y =( W + P0)(1 + rb) − 2
p
W (1 + rb)(P0(1 + rb) − P1).
B.2 Region V, VI, VIII
In Regions V, VI, and VIII the frontier implies indiﬀerence between buying the durable cash and borrowing,
versus buying the durable credit and lending. This yields
Y =
(P1 − P0(1 + ra))(1 + rb)+
p
(1 + rb)(1+ra)(W(rb − ra) − P0(1 + rb)+P1)
rb − ra
28B.3 Region VII, IX
In Region VII and IX the frontier is characterized by indiﬀerence between buying the durable cash and
borrowing, versus buying the durable credit and lending, which results in:
Y =( 1+ra)(W − P0)+( P1 − (1 + ra)P0)+2
p
(P1 − (1 + ra)P0)(W − P0)(1 + ra) .
B.4 Continuity
Table: Continuity Cash-Credit Indiﬀerence
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30Figure 1: A graphical representation of the Euler conditions for choice of C and A, conditional on
whether the good is purchased with cash, on an installment loan basis, or not at all.
31Figure 2: Partition of the {current funds, future funds} plane according to whether the durable goods
is purchased with cash, credit, or not at all, and to whether the resulting intertemporal choices entail
positive assets, negative assets, or a binding liquidity contraint.
32Figure 3: Consumer purchase decisions: implications of diﬀerent utility levels from durable purchase.
33Figure 4: Consumer purchase decisions: implications of diﬀerent borrowing rates; internal rate of
return set equal to the average of lending and borrowing rate.
34Figure 5: Consumer purchase decisions: implications of diﬀerent installment-credit interest rates.
35Figure 6: Interest factor charged to customers by price-discriminating dealer, as a function of the
spread between the customers’ unconditional borrowing and lending rates.
36Figure 7: Interest factor charged to customers by price-discriminating dealer, as a function of the
bank’s required rate on installment payment plans.
37Table 1: Internal rates of return, installment credit and personal loans, by item purchased
item furniture motorcycles (used) cars new cars white goods hh appliances brown goods computers telephony
# observations 8239 5553 5061 6884 4420 8466 16163 3741 17982
Adj. R-squared 0.5612 0.6778 0.7444 0.6175 0.4549 0.3860 0.4423 0.4165 0.5058
coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value coeff. t-value
contract characteristics
log(loan size in LIT) -0.0223 -26.31 -0.0067 -5.84 -0.0173 -18.99 -0.0036 -4.74 0.0058 2.34 0.0008 0.57 -0.0068 -7.24 -0.0151 -7.83 0.0022 1.91
duration in months -0.0003 -5.35 -0.0001 -0.75 0.0000 0.66 -0.0001 -2.59 -0.0014 -4.28 -0.0002 -1.26 0.0002 1.41 -0.0010 -5.84 -0.0008 -5.41
insurance* 0.0396 7.94 0.0406 9.25 0.0409 6.37 0.0102 1.67 0.1087 12.55 0.1120 19.15 0.1174 28.64 0.1018 7.84 0.1140 27.30
repayment via bank* -0.0079 -6.54 -0.0029 -2.16 -0.0087 -9.51 -0.0029 -5.38 -0.0083 -3.40 -0.0091 -4.67 -0.0059 -4.74 -0.0077 -3.81 -0.0060 -5.10
personal loan
personal loan [PL] 0.0398 0.84 0.2701 2.71 0.3514 9.98 0.2916 8.85 - - - - - - - - - -
PL x log loan size -0.0025 -0.84 -0.0173 -2.74 -0.0191 -8.83 -0.0160 -8.07 - - - - - - - - - -
PL x insurance -0.0269 -5.05 0.0191 1.19 -0.0193 -3.77 -0.0291 -5.80 - - - - - - - - - -
PL x quarter dummy -0.0011 -2.19 -0.0016 -1.54 -0.0024 -4.15 -0.0027 -6.69 - - - - - - - - - -
regions
Piemonte/Vald'Aosta 0.0053 0.54 -0.0164 -1.44 -0.0131 -1.46 0.0242 2.99 0.0398 2.74 0.0518 4.80 0.0628 8.91 0.0398 1.90 0.0391 4.32
Lombardia/Liguria -0.0138 -1.93 -0.0022 -0.33 -0.0249 -3.18 0.0019 0.34 -0.0308 -2.56 -0.0113 -1.37 0.0108 1.71 -0.0071 -0.41 0.0113 1.51
Trentino/Veneto/Friuli -0.0221 -2.24 -0.0363 -2.99 -0.0281 -0.97 -0.0236 -2.13 -0.0102 -0.74 -0.0028 -0.24 0.0143 1.83 -0.0363 -1.13 -0.0005 -0.04
EmiliaRomagna -0.0359 -4.15 -0.0043 -0.34 -0.0427 -4.15 0.0009 0.09 0.0093 0.57 -0.0002 -0.02 -0.0003 -0.04 -0.0435 -1.78 0.0190 2.03
Toscana -0.0107 -1.22 -0.0110 -1.41 -0.0257 -3.12 -0.0019 -0.35 -0.0078 -0.56 0.0048 0.47 -0.0032 -0.43 0.0442 1.62 -0.0059 -0.61
Umbria/Marche -0.0366 -2.08 -0.0312 -2.66 -0.0278 -1.79 0.0090 0.60 -0.0377 -1.66 -0.0212 -1.28 0.0126 1.09 0.0155 1.43 -0.0035 -0.22
Abruzzo/Molise -0.0237 -1.85 -0.0110 -0.90 -0.0336 -1.88 0.0030 0.58 -0.0119 -0.78 -0.0065 -0.41 0.0186 1.98 -0.0108 -0.29 0.0317 2.55
Campania -0.0032 -0.38 -0.0186 -2.97 -0.0081 -0.99 -0.0171 -3.23 -0.0114 -0.88 -0.0239 -2.35 0.0088 1.40 0.0152 0.76 -0.0088 -1.43
Puglia/Basil./Calabria 0.0065 0.84 -0.0267 -3.99 -0.0292 -3.63 -0.0271 -5.18 -0.0107 -0.90 -0.0070 -0.84 0.0059 0.92 0.0130 0.62 -0.0037 -0.58
Sicilia -0.0094 -1.26 -0.0277 -4.89 -0.0420 -5.69 -0.0283 -6.15 0.0110 0.93 0.0114 1.35 -0.0012 -0.17 -0.0093 -0.37 0.0080 1.21
Sardegna -0.0169 -1.64 -0.0181 -1.59 -0.0426 -3.48 -0.0065 -1.02 0.0063 0.36 0.0077 0.45 0.0178 1.59 -0.0158 -0.69 0.0003 0.02
intercept 0.6329 49.15 0.4021 23.39 0.5520 36.64 0.2682 21.15 0.2687 8.02 0.3075 16.31 0.4070 30.17 0.5490 17.11 0.2908 18.21
Source: Findomestic Banca, authors' calculations.
Note: Time dummies, their interaction with insurance and the interaction of the region dummies with time and insurance, respectively, are included in the regression, but not reported.
*: dummy variable
-: not enough observations for personal loans to estimate the coefficients.
Items purchased are classified as follows: furniture includes all sorts of home furnishing, such as living and bedrooms and (modular) kitchens; motorcycles includes motorcycles and scooters; (used) cars includes 
cars, motorhomes, and caravans: they may or may not be second-hand; new cars includes cars, motorhomes, and caravans that are classified as being new; white goods include fridges, freezers, washing 
machines, dishwashers; household appliances are those not classified as white or brown goods; brown goods are consumer electronics like TV sets, VCRs, radios, cameras, etc. excluding home computers; 
computers and telephony cannot further be subdivided.Table 2: Probit for dealer subsidies, by item purchased, 1996-98
item furniture motorcycles (used) cars new cars white goods hh appliances brown goods computers telephony
# observations 13003 12365 4437 6186 7373 13141 24641 4900 22352
log-likelihood -6889.51 -6262.54 -1017.69 -1045.52 -3806.35 -6871.05 -12400.6 -1628.59 -8675.41
marginal marginal marginal marginal marginal marginal marginal marginal marginal
effect t-value effect t-value effect t-value effect t-value effect t-value effect t-value effect t-value effect t-value effect t-value
applicant's characteristics
age -0.0006 -0.96 -0.0004 -0.54 0.0006 2.36 -0.0001 -1.15 -0.0014 -2.68 -0.0013 -2.57 -0.0004 -1.36 -0.0006 -1.38 -0.0003 -1.50
# children*
1 child -0.0034 -0.32 0.0604 3.05 0.0096 0.94 0.0028 0.56 0.0024 0.11 0.0057 0.50 -0.0101 -0.95 -0.0250 -2.40 -0.0085 -1.27
2 children 0.0194 1.18 0.0826 5.55 0.0186 1.75 -0.0044 -1.03 0.0019 0.13 -0.0062 -0.39 -0.0142 -1.09 -0.0262 -2.19 -0.0125 -1.54
3 or more 0.0051 0.22 0.0539 2.98 0.0124 0.73 0.0057 0.53 -0.0139 -0.75 -0.0343 -2.04 -0.0566 -4.01 -0.0216 -1.75 -0.0274 -3.85
marital status*
couple 0.0357 1.93 0.0504 2.20 -0.0082 -0.67 0.0031 0.73 0.0118 0.51 0.0307 1.92 0.0514 4.45 0.0303 2.94 0.0208 2.60
divorced -0.0174 -0.84 -0.0414 -1.49 -0.0056 -0.34 -0.0108 -1.26 0.0531 1.11 -0.0487 -1.90 0.0536 2.68 0.0374 1.53 0.0077 0.63
widowed -0.0353 -1.21 0.0057 0.15 -0.0353 -2.58 -0.0061 -0.74 -0.0100 -0.30 -0.0115 -0.44 0.0234 1.10 -0.0035 -0.11 -0.0210 -1.59
residential status*
owner w mortgage -0.0728 -4.23 -0.0419 -1.09 0.0021 0.12 -0.0048 -0.53 -0.0285 -0.98 -0.0208 -0.52 -0.0344 -1.39 -0.0360 -2.47 -0.0191 -1.46
tenant -0.1033 -7.51 -0.0838 -5.20 -0.0206 -2.96 -0.0056 -1.24 -0.0428 -2.44 -0.0464 -3.01 -0.0256 -1.75 0.0098 0.99 -0.0088 -0.95
lives with relatives -0.0235 -1.36 -0.0301 -1.24 -0.0181 -1.89 -0.0069 -1.68 -0.0320 -1.17 -0.0195 -1.19 -0.0126 -1.14 -0.0071 -0.82 -0.0124 -1.52
contract characteristics
log(loan size in LIT) 0.0248 1.62 0.1453 4.83 -0.0232 -1.55 0.0263 9.27 0.3150 12.80 0.1430 11.19 0.1678 14.66 0.0577 7.94 0.1301 14.56
duration in months -0.0075 -4.16 -0.0337 -13.89 -0.0009 -2.17 -0.0027 -15.39 -0.0584 -7.91 -0.0390 -9.77 -0.0488 -8.68 -0.0255 -8.75 -0.0404 -10.87
insurance* -0.4467 -20.72 -0.6392 -15.59 -0.0413 -1.91 0.0075 2.00 -0.4196 -18.79 -0.3860 -17.85 -0.3733 -30.52 -0.0732 -5.82 -0.2127 -19.28
repayment via bank* 0.1518 11.01 0.0677 4.26 0.0734 6.89 -0.0011 -0.10 0.1408 8.63 0.1427 8.94 0.0816 7.87 0.0127 1.86 0.0685 7.24
transmission of application*
fax -0.1127 -2.71 -0.1013 -3.52 -0.0848 -3.38 -0.0015 -0.16 -0.2163 -3.92 -0.0418 -1.05 -0.1948 -4.64 -0.0691 -8.08 -0.0879 -6.09
phone -0.1610 -4.98 -0.0940 -3.19 -0.0878 -5.25 -0.0094 -1.08 -0.1577 -3.63 -0.0932 -3.28 -0.1606 -6.27 -0.0847 -6.73 -0.0952 -6.46
other -0.0601 -0.75 -0.1282 -2.86 -0.0311 -1.63 -** - -0.0784 -0.87 0.0743 1.23 -0.1164 -1.99 -0.0371 -1.62 -0.0308 -0.91
financial market
rdiff (rate spread) -0.0174 -1.05 -0.0206 -1.16 -0.0216 -2.76 -0.0106 -5.93 0.0231 1.50 0.0323 2.85 0.0409 2.78 -0.0111 -1.55 0.0128 1.33
rf -2.4314 -2.11 -2.8066 -2.57 1.3132 1.30 0.1459 0.55 -0.7631 -0.74 -1.6481 -2.13 -1.8272 -1.50 -0.9154 -2.52 -1.6722 -3.48
Source: Findomestic Banca, authors' calculations.
Note: see Table 1. Standard errors are adjusted for variables varying only across regions and time.
Financial market variables: rdiff is the spread between the banking sector's borrowing and lending rate indicators from Banca d'Italia, Sintesi delle note sull'andamento
dell'economia delle regioni italiane, 1997-98-99-2000, Tav.aD6 (we use the last yearly observation). These indicators are based on sampling of large deposit and lending rates 
(only deposits over 20 million LIT and loans or lines of credit over 150 million LIT are considered), hence far from comparable in levels to observed consumer lending rates.
rf is estimated, at the regional level, from our data base (see text for detail).
Quarterly time dummies are also included (not shown).
*: (set of) dummy variable(s); reference groups for dummy sets are: no children, single (never married), outright home owner, remote-online technology
**: variable dropped because of collinearity.
***:variable dropped because predicts perfectly.Table 3: Probit for dealer subsidies, by item purchased, 1996 controlling for 1995-98 income growth
item furniture motorcycles (used) cars new cars white goods hh appliances brown goods computers telephony
# observations 2283 3417 984 6186 1536 2615 5800 534 3642
log-likelihood -995.05 -1500.10 -134.97 -1045.52 -543.64 -1103.55 -2086.54 -132.90 -968.50
marginal marginal marginal marginal marginal marginal marginal marginal marginal
effect t-value effect t-value effect t-value effect t-value effect t-value effect t-value effect t-value effect t-value effect t-value
applicant's characteristics
age -0.0020 -1.63 -0.0017 -1.65 -0.0003 -2.57 0.0007 1.01 -0.0030 -4.61 -0.0005 -0.40 -0.0009 -1.34 -0.0001 -0.93 -0.0002 -0.93
# children*
1 child 0.0319 1.19 0.1098 3.51 -0.0008 -0.43 0.0717 1.65 -0.0497 -1.40 0.0288 0.99 0.0060 0.53 -0.0021 -0.49 0.0155 2.15
2 children 0.0688 1.96 0.0862 3.76 -0.0030 -0.92 0.0084 0.21 -0.0296 -1.39 -0.0260 -0.83 -0.0181 -1.55 0.0038 0.58 -0.0037 -0.43
3 or more 0.0735 1.27 0.0906 2.93 0.0064 1.12 0.0365 0.48 -0.0323 -0.64 -0.0440 -1.04 -0.0269 -2.02 -0.0008 -0.13 -0.0072 -0.74
marital status*
couple -0.0413 -1.10 0.0140 0.32 0.0032 0.96 0.0127 0.52 0.0424 0.92 0.0195 0.51 0.0219 1.21 0.0051 0.63 -0.0007 -0.09
divorced -0.0366 -0.98 -0.0224 -0.37 0.0409 2.64 0.0084 0.19 0.0604 0.95 -0.0639 -1.09 0.0290 0.90 0.0256 1.36 -0.0063 -0.35
widowed -0.0979 -1.73 -0.0303 -0.35 0.0018 0.17 0.0172 0.32 -0.0322 -0.42 0.0101 0.22 0.0005 0.01 -*** - -0.0136 -0.80
residential status*
owner w mortgage -0.0283 -0.54 -0.0504 -0.68 -0.0040 -0.99 -0.0856 -1.09 -0.0001 0.00 -0.0226 -0.43 -0.0028 -0.08 -0.0052 -1.63 0.0078 0.32
tenant -0.0606 -2.63 -0.1101 -6.77 -0.0016 -0.52 -0.0465 -1.61 -0.0342 -1.32 -0.0164 -1.08 -0.0259 -1.48 0.0000 -0.01 -0.0142 -1.80
lives with relatives -0.0456 -0.93 -0.0700 -3.77 -0.0082 -3.43 0.0001 0.00 0.0272 0.98 -0.0163 -0.51 -0.0203 -1.35 0.0015 0.25 -0.0159 -2.20
contract characteristics
log(loan size in LIT) 0.0303 1.24 0.2443 4.38 -0.0175 -6.87 0.1009 6.52 0.2532 5.53 0.1746 8.60 0.1268 12.25 0.0127 3.36 0.0726 8.82
duration in months -0.0141 -7.23 -0.0325 -7.75 -0.0007 -3.27 -0.0114 -13.34 -0.1259 -8.17 -0.0700 -9.66 -0.0733 -10.74 -0.0076 -5.32 -0.0335 -10.12
insurance* -0.4619 -18.28 -0.7406 -7.56 -0.0062 -2.96 -*** - -0.3951 -5.76 -0.2697 -8.17 -0.2743 -23.26 -0.0180 -3.54 -0.1558 -9.89
repayment via bank* 0.1676 5.95 0.1327 4.53 0.0214 3.90 0.0388 1.11 0.0803 1.94 0.1507 8.97 0.0347 2.52 0.0013 0.43 0.0142 1.44
transmission of application*
fax** - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
phone -0.1208 -2.98 -0.1269 -3.46 -0.0236 -1.89 0.0345 0.67 -0.1323 -2.30 -0.0701 -2.43 -0.0976 -4.43 -0.0347 -9.18 -0.0361 -2.16
other -0.0813 -1.04 -0.2870 -3.36 0.0077 0.49 -0.1318 -0.83 0.1314 1.74 0.1489 1.38 -0.0616 -2.23 -0.0048 -1.24 -0.0114 -0.63
income growth 0.6649 1.28 0.1552 0.39 0.0889 4.12 -** - -0.5566 -1.95 -0.6569 -2.95 -0.5585 -2.64 0.0030 0.09 -0.2506 -1.97
financial market
rdiff (rate spread) 0.0241 0.54 -0.0245 -0.70 -0.0009 -0.72 -0.0612 -5.15 -0.0080 -0.31 0.0035 0.20 0.0156 0.98 0.0002 0.16 -0.0067 -0.70
rf -5.4077 -1.98 -2.7801 -2.46 0.1988 1.60 0.2100 0.28 -1.7328 -2.73 -1.7958 -3.12 -1.3546 -2.19 -0.1193 -1.89 -0.7304 -2.10
Source: Findomestic Banca, authors' calculations.
Note: See Tables 1 and 2. Standard errors are adjusted for variables varying only across regions.
Definition of income growth measure: average, by region (defined as in Table 1), of 1998-95 log personal income differences from the 1998 SHIW panel sample.
The 1995/1998 SHIW panel component includes 2,669 households. To remove outliers, observations in the top and bottom percentile of the initial and final personal 
income distributions are excluded from the computation.
Definition of financial market variables: see Table 2. 